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CHINA’S PRACTICE OF PROCURING ORGANS 
FROM EXECUTED PRISONERS:   
HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS MUST NARROWLY TAILOR 
THEIR CRITICISM AND ENDORSE THE CHINESE 
CONSTITUTION TO END ABUSES 
Joan E. Hemphill† 
   Abstract:  For the past two decades, human rights groups, medical organizations, 
and the international media have excoriated China for procuring transplant organs from 
executed prisoners.  This practice was first authorized under China’s 1984 “Temporary 
Rules Concerning the Utilization of Corpses or Organs from the Corpses of Executed 
Criminals” and it is widely used by the Chinese government.  Reports from Chinese 
doctors and media sources reveal significant deficiencies both in the text and application 
of China’s current organ-procurement laws.  The lack of clear legal parameters and the 
absence of enforcement measures have opened the door to problems of interpretation and 
misapplication, resulting in the physical abuse of prisoners.  This situation is further 
exacerbated by China’s proclivity to sell prisoner organs to foreign buyers on the black 
market.  For these reasons, advocacy groups view China’s procurement of prisoner 
organs as an infringement of prisoner rights, and they promote its abolition.   
In response to international concern over China’s participation in the organ trade, 
the Chinese government recently enacted the 2006 “Provisions on the Administration of 
Entry and Exit of Cadavers and Treatment of Cadavers,” which prohibit organs from 
exiting Chinese territory without government authorization.  Although it is premature to 
fully assess the efficacy of this law, the 2006 Provisions fail to modify the 1984 Order, 
leaving its most significant shortcomings intact.  The 2006 Provisions do not regulate 
organ procurement from prisoner cadavers, nor do they address how organ-removal 
procedures are conducted or applied.  China’s present organ-procurement scheme is, 
consequently, inadequate to protect prisoners from abuse.  Human rights groups continue 
to press for reforms in China’s organ-procurement practice, but current lobbying efforts 
are ineffective because they lack compelling legal and political force in the Chinese 
system.  Human rights groups must provide stronger legal support, and narrow the focus 
of reform efforts to make a more persuasive argument for the elimination of prisoner 
abuse.  China’s constitution provides a viable legal foundation for reform arguments 
because it requires the Chinese government to preserve and protect human rights.  It is 
binding on all national laws, and it can be implemented to end prisoner abuse by 
requiring organ-procurement laws to conform to its proscriptions.  Instead of pressuring 
China to enact sweeping legislation and adopt international ethical standards, reform 
efforts must endorse the application of Chinese constitutional human rights requirements 
to improve the treatment of prisoners in the organ-procurement practice.    
                                           
†  The author attends the University of Washington and plans to receive her J.D. degree in 2008.  
She would like to thank Professors Dongsheng Zang and Joel Ngugi as well as the Pacific Rim Law and 
Policy Journal editorial staff, who were instrumental in the development of this comment.  Any errors or 
omissions in this comment are the author’s own. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2001, Chinese surgeon Dr. Wang Guoqi testified before the United 
States Congress that he performed more than 100 operations to remove skin 
and corneas from executed prisoners.1  Although the practice of procuring 
organs from prisoner cadavers is legal in China, Dr. Guoqi described ways in 
which prisoners were abused during the process.2  He emphasized one 
particular incident in 1995 that has “tortured [his] conscience to no end.”3  
The incident occurred in the Hebei Province, where Dr. Guoqi and a team of 
doctors were called to extract skin and kidneys from a prisoner’s body.4  
During the execution, the guard misfired his gun, shooting the prisoner 
several inches short of the target, and leaving him convulsing on the 
ground.5  Although the prisoner was still alive, the supervising official 
ordered the doctors to proceed with organ removal in a nearby ambulance.6  
The prisoner continued to breathe even after both of his kidneys were 
extracted.7  While officials rushed the kidneys to medical units, Dr. Guoqi 
and his colleagues began to remove the skin from the prisoner’s half-dead 
body.8   Hearing noises outside and fearing an attack from the prisoner’s 
family, the doctors forced the mangled prisoner into a plastic bag, and left 
him to die.9  Haunted by this and other memories of prisoner abuse, Dr. 
Guoqi ultimately refused to participate in the organ-procurement practice.10  
He was subsequently forced to submit a pledge not to expose his work, nor 
                                           
1
  Organs for Sale: China’s Growing Trade and Ultimate Violation of Prisoners’ Rights:  Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Intl. Operations and Human Rights of the H.R. Comm. on Intl. Relations, 107th 
Cong., 57-58 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Dr. Wang Guoqi, discussing his experience in 
China’s organ-procurement practice at the Tianjin General Brigade Hospital in Tianjin, China); contra 
China Fury at Organ Snatching ‘Lies,’ BBC NEWS, June 28, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-
pacific/1411389.stm (rebuking Dr. Guoqi’s testimony as lies and fabrications, without denying Chinese 
government used organs from executed prisoners).   
2
   Guanyu Liyong Sixing Zuifan Shiti Huo Shiti Qiguan de Zanxing Guiding, in Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Falu Guifanxing Jieshi Jicheng [Temporary Rules Concerning the Utilization of Corpses or 
Organs from the Corpses of Executed Criminals] [hereinafter 1984 Order] (authorizing the use of organs 
from executed prisoners for transplant and research purposes), see Hearings, supra note 1, at 50-53, 57-59 
(providing both a Chinese and an English version of China’s 1984 Order, and discussing how prisoners are 
abused during organ-procurement procedures); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, Country Report 1994: Organ 
Procurement and Judicial Execution in China, August 1994, available at http://www.hrw.org/ 
reports/1994/china1/china_948.htm#N_100A (providing an English translation of China’s 1984 Order). 
3
   Hearings, supra note 1, at 58-59.    
4
   Id. at 58.  
5
   Id. 
6
   Id. at 58-59. 
7
   Id. at 59.  
8
   Id.  
9
   Id.  
10
  Id. 
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to reveal that organs are sold for profit by the Chinese government.11  When 
Dr. Guoqi left China in 2000, the Chinese government was still procuring 
organs from prisoner corpses at execution sites.12 
Evidence of physical abuse, such as that witnessed by Dr. Guoqi,13 has 
prompted international criticism of China’s practice of procuring organs 
from executed criminals.14  Critics of China’s organ-procurement practice 
assert that it compromises the legitimate administration of China’s penal 
process, and results in brutal forms of prisoner abuse.15  Human rights 
groups press China to reform both the organ-procurement and death-penalty 
practices, but these efforts unnecessarily expand the scope of the issue 
beyond the elimination of prisoner abuse, and misguidedly promote China’s 
adoption of international standards on human rights.16  For this reason, a 
                                           
11
  Id.  
12
  Id. 
13
  Id. 
14
  See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 63 (testifying before the U.S. Congress, Doctor Thomas Diflo, 
a New York-based surgeon, said “there are numerous eyewitness accounts of continued movement and 
heart activity in some of the prisoner/donors, indicating that these people have been subject to the removal 
of their organs while they are, strictly speaking, still alive.” Dr. Diflo condemns the practice of procuring 
and selling Chinese prisoners’ organs, stating “this [practice] obviously represents a significant breach of 
medical ethics for these doctors in that the primary tenet of our profession, to do no harm, is violated on a 
continuous and ongoing basis”); Republic of China: The Olympics Countdown—Failing to Keep Human 
Rights Promises, AMNESTY INT’L, Sept. 21, 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ 
ENGASA170462006 [hereinafter Olympics Countdown] (asserting that obtaining actual consent in a penal 
context is impossible due to the “trauma” and “anguish” of execution); The World Medical Association 
Council Resolution on Organ Donation in China [hereinafter WMA Resolution], adopted at the 173rd 
World Medical Association Council Session, Divonne-les-Bains, France, May 2005, available at 
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/cr_5.htm (condemning organ procurement when consent is not given by 
executed prisoners, and when there is no opportunity to refuse the procedure); HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2 (arguing that organ procurement should be abolished because of the difficulty 
of obtaining actual consent in a criminal justice context). 
15
  See Hearings, supra note 1, at 57, 67 (detailing instances of prisoner abuse); Geoffrey Crothall, 
Executions ‘Main Source of Organs’ for Transplant Programme, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 29 1994, 
at 1, available at 1994 WLNR 2313630 (outlining forms of prisoner abuse that occur during organ 
procurement). See also Duncan Hewitt, Shanghai Balks at Organ Donation, BBC NEWS, Nov. 20, 2000, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1032537.stm (suggesting that a primary fault in China’s 
organ-procurement law is the lack of penal measures for the commercial use of organs).   
16
  Examples of human rights criticisms based on international standards include: Amnesty 
International’s position that the profit motive behind organ-procurement will sustain and possibly increase 
the Chinese government’s application of the death penalty, see Olympics Countdown, supra note 14 
(criticizing China’s organ-procurement practice for failing to conform to international standards on 
informed consent); Hearings, supra note 1, at 9-10, 12 (calling for an end to China’s practice of procuring 
organs from executed prisoners, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Michael E. Parmly cites China’s poor 
human rights record, lack of transparency, and deficient enforcement of existing organ-procurement laws); 
Julie Lerat, Business Macabre: La Vente d’Organes de Prisonniers Exécutés, ENSEMBLE CONTRE LA PEINE 
DE MORT, Jan. 2, 2007, available at http://www.abolition.fr/ecpm/french/article.php?art=434&suj=142 
(criticizing China’s involvement in the organ trade, and asserting that this practice creates an obstacle for 
abolishing the death penalty). 
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new approach is needed to lend legal support to lobbying efforts, and to 
present the Chinese government with a more convincing case for reform.  
Part II of this Comment outlines China’s practice of procuring organs 
from prisoner cadavers, explaining the Chinese government’s strong 
economic incentive to use prisoner organs for commercial purposes, and 
detailing human rights groups’ criticisms of this practice.  Part III asserts that 
human rights groups’ current approach to reforming China’s organ-
procurement practice is ineffective because it relies on international 
standards and advocates for broad reforms.  Part IV analyzes the legal 
framework behind China’s organ-procurement practice, comparing the 
recent 2006 Provisions on the transportation of cadavers to China’s 1984 
Order on the utilization of prisoner corpses, and demonstrating how these 
laws fail to square with Chinese constitutional principles on human rights.  
Part V argues that the Chinese constitution must be fully implemented to 
modify and reform China’s organ-procurement laws.  Part VI recommends 
human rights groups target their criticisms at ending the most serious 
instances of prisoner abuse, and endorsing the application of Chinese 
constitutional human rights requirements to lobby more effectively for 
reforms.  Part VII concludes this comment. 
II. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ASSERT CHINA’S USE OF PRISONER ORGANS 
RESULTS IN ABUSE BECAUSE IT IS DRIVEN BY ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
AND AUTHORIZED BY DEFICIENT LAWS 
In many parts of the world, there is a wide disparity between the 
demand and the supply of available transplant organs.17  Confronted with 
long waiting lists, and the close prospect of death, patients from around the 
globe are traveling to China to obtain transplant organs for a price.18  The 
Chinese government’s harsh penal system and legalized practice of 
procuring organs from prisoner cadavers yields a large supply of human 
                                           
17
  D.J. Rothman et al., Bellagio Task Force Report on Transplantation, Bodily Integrity, and the 
International Traffic in Organs, 29 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2739-45 (1997) http://www.icrc.org/ 
Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNYK; David McNeill & Clifford Coonan, Japanese Flock to China for 
Organ Transplants, ASIA TIMES, Apr. 4, 2006, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/ 
HD04Ad01.html; Hearings, supra note 1, at 63 (reporting that there are not enough organs to meet the 
demand for transplant surgeries in the United States). 
18
  McNeill & Coonan, supra note 17 (discussing how patients from Japan, Malaysia, Canada, and 
the U.S. receive organ transplants in China); U.S. Patients Line Up for Inmates’ Organs, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Eng.), Nov. 12, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 6259236 (describing how patients from the U.S., Japan, 
and Southeast Asia are purchasing prisoner organs in China); Vanessa Hua, Patients Seeking Transplants 
Turn to China: Rights Activists Fear Organs Are Taken from Executed Prisoners, S. F. CHRON., Apr. 17, 
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 6395567; Ros Davidson, Death Row Black Market for Organs, SUNDAY 
HERALD (Eng.), Nov. 25 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 3856091. 
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transplant organs.19  Consequently, the Chinese government has developed a 
highly lucrative, yet clandestine market for the sale of prisoner organs.20  
Foreigners are often willing to pay tens of thousands of dollars to receive 
organ transplants in China that would take years to obtain in their home 
countries, and many of these patients are undeterred by the knowledge that 
transplant organs are culled from prisoner corpses.21  In response to China’s 
commercial use of prisoner organs, and mounting evidence of prisoner 
abuse, human rights groups worry that China’s organ-procurement practice 
leads to the mistreatment of prisoners.22 
A. The High Global Demand for Transplant Organs Presents China with 
a Strong Economic Incentive to Sell Prisoner Body Parts 
Internationally, the demand for transplant organs greatly exceeds the 
supply, creating a shortage of organs in many parts of the world.23  In China, 
                                           
19
  1984 Order, supra note 2 (legalizing the use of prisoner organs for transplant and research 
purposes); Tim Johnson, China’s Organ Supply Questioned as Transplants Soar, SAN JOSE MERCURY 
NEWS, Apr. 13, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 6213327 (discussing China’s “seemingly endless” 
supply of organs due to the Chinese government’s prolific use of the death penalty). See also Stanley 
Oziewicz, Shady World of Transplant Tourism in China Exposed, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 5, 2001, 
at 14, available at 2001 WLNR 3736410 (reporting that a Canadian business targets China because it 
considers it to be the largest available source of human transplant organs). 
20
  See Davidson, supra note 18 (reporting that China’s underground sales of prisoner organs create a 
highly lucrative business); Jane Macartney, China to ‘Tidy Up’ Trade in Executed Prisoners’ Organs, 
TIMES ONLINE (Eng.), Dec. 3, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,25689-1901558,00.html 
(discussing the “big business” of organ transplant surgery in China); Vivian Wu, Removing Stigma From a 
Noble Cause, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 1, 2006, at 6, available at 2006 WLNR 5420456 (reporting 
that a large industry has grown around the practice of selling Chinese prisoners’ organs to foreign buyers, 
and that Chinese hospitals have endeavored to keep the source of  transplant organs secret); Sonya 
Bryskine, Organ Trade Booming in China, EPOCH TIMES (P.R.C.), Mar. 15, 2006, 
http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/6-3-15/39332.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (discussing China’s 
“flourishing organ trade,” and the secret nature of China’s organ-procurement practice). 
21
  See Erik Baard & Rebecca Cooney, The People’s Republic Has Long Been Suspected of Selling 
Organs from Prisoners: Now One New York Doctor Knows the Rumors are True, VILLAGE VOICE, May 2-
8, 2001, available at http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0118,baard,24344,1.html; Desperate 
Singaporeans Seek Kidney Transplants in China, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 3, 2006, available at 
www.westlaw.com (World News); Mark Magnier & Alan Zarembo, China Admits Taking Executed 
Prisoners’ Organs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2006, available at http://www.latimes.com/la-fg-
organs18nov18,0,4772205.story?coll=la-home-headlines (describing cases in which foreign patients spent 
thousands of dollars to obtain transplants in China). 
22
  See, e.g., Letter to the Editor, Organ Harvesting in China Must End, NORTHCIFFE NEWSPAPERS 
(Eng.), Sept. 7, 2006, at 20, available at 2006 WLNR 15554830 (contending China’s practice of procuring 
organs must end because it violates the human rights of Chinese prisoners); Rothman et al., supra note 17 
(asserting that organ procurement is “subject to gross abuse” because the practice is kept secret); Johnson, 
supra note 19 (expressing concern that prisoners are not always respected during organ procurement); 
Olympics Countdown, supra note 14 (discussing how China’s profit motive and record of corruption may 
lead to abusive practices in organ procurement).  
23
  See Force the Dead to Donate Organs, BBC NEWS, Feb. 17, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
health/281404.stm (Dr. John Harris, of the British Medical Association’s Ethics Committee, stated, 
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Transplant organ supplies are limited due to low donation numbers and strict 
national regulations.24  In countries such as the United States, Malaysia, 
Australia, and the United Kingdom, patients often spend years on waiting 
lists to receive vital organs.25  Consequently, patients who can afford to 
purchase organs abroad travel to China to obtain transplant surgeries.26 
Human rights critics assert China’s organ-procurement laws and 
widespread use of the death penalty provide a consistent source of executed 
prisoners for transplant purposes.27  Some Chinese transplant specialists 
estimate that up to ninety-nine percent of the organs used for transplant 
surgeries in China come from prisoner cadavers.28  Current Chinese media 
reports claim China performs an average of 10,000 transplant surgeries 
annually, out of approximately two million domestic requests for organs.29  
                                                                                                                              
“Thousand[s] of people in the UK, and tens of thousands world-wide, are dying because of the shortage of 
organs”); Craig S. Smith, Doctor Says He Took Transplant Organs from Executed Prisoner, N. Y. TIMES, 
June 29, 2001, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res= 
9F02EED81739F93AA15755C0A9679C8B63&sec=health&pagewanted=all; cf. Nancy Scheper-Hughes, 
The New Cannibalism, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Apr. 1998, available at http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/ 
biotech/organswatch/pages/cannibalism.html (arguing that modern cultures have developed an artificial 
need for transplant organs); Julia Rommelfanger, Kidney for Cash: Organ Trafficking Poses New 
Challenges, MEDSCAPE MEDICAL NEWS, Oct. 18, 2005.   
24
  See Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of Executed Prisoners, LAOGAI  
RESEARCH FOUND., Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.laogai.org/news/newsdetail.php?id=2528 (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2007); Geoffrey Crothall, supra note 15; Craig S. Smith, Quandary in U.S. Over Use of Organs of 
Chinese Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
fullpage.html?sec=health&res (detailing how many foreign patients seek transplants from China due to the 
lack of available organs in their home countries); Hearings, supra note 1, at 63; Rommelfanger, supra note 
23 (testifying at the 12th Congress of the European Society for Organ Transplantation, Dr. Jose Fernando 
Teixeira, president of the European Transplant Coordinators Organization, said patients turn to China for 
organ transplants due to restricted donation in their home countries).      
25
  See Smith, supra note 24; BBC NEWS, Gaining Kidney From an Execution, June 28, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1412467.stm (reporting that due to Malaysia’s sixteen-year 
waiting list to obtain transplant organs, a Malaysian woman purchased a prisoner’s kidney in China). 
26
  See, e.g., McNeill & Coonan, supra note 17 (reporting that wealthy Japanese patients obtain organ 
transplants in China); Julian Siddle, Global Demand Fuels Human Organ Trade, BBC NEWS, June 28, 
2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/asia-pacific/1412348.stm (discussing Dr. Wang Guoqi’s 
testimony that prisoner organs are sold to rich foreigners); Smith, supra note 23 (reporting that although 
patients travel to countries such as India, Russia, and the Philippines to purchase transplants, China is 
considered as one of the top suppliers of transplant organs); Deborah L. Shelton, Organ Trade in China 
Raises Alarm Over Human Rights, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 24, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 
WLNR 14481146 (detailing how foreign patients purchase transplant organs in China). 
27
  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2; 1984 Order, supra note 2 (authorizing organ 
procurement from prisoner cadavers); Ella Lee, Bumper Organ Supply Before Lunar Festival, S. CHINA 
MORNING POST, Jan. 9, 2000, at 3, available at 2000 WLNR 3477087 (reporting that mass executions, 
conducted during Chinese festivals, provide ‘adequate supplies’ of organs from executed prisoners); Craig 
S. Smith, On Death Row, China's Source of Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B00E4D7143EF93BA25753C1A9679C8B63&sec=health
&spon=&pagewanted=all (reporting that executed prisoners are China’s main source of transplant organs).  
28
  Olympics Countdown, supra note 14. 
29
  Group Urges China to Detail Transplants, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 2006 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-11-19-china-prisoners_x.htm?csp=34 (reporting that Deputy 
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The actual figures are difficult to verify due to state secrecy surrounding the 
practice.30  Additionally, medical and technological capabilities for organ 
removal and transplant surgery continue to advance in China, making once 
sophisticated procedures readily obtainable.31  In terms of supply, analysts 
report that up to sixty-eight offenses are punishable by the death penalty in 
China, and execution numbers soar during China’s periodical “Strike-Hard” 
campaigns.32  Such programs enhance the penalty for many non-violent 
crimes.33  There is an especially high death toll during the Chinese lunar 
holiday when the Chinese government conducts mass executions.34  China’s 
penal system ultimately increases the flow of prisoner cadavers to the 
Chinese transplant network.35 
The renewable source of prisoner organs provides the Chinese 
government with a strong economic incentive to sell human organs to 
foreign buyers.36  Due to the high global demand for transplant organs and 
                                                                                                                              
Prime Minister Huang Jiefu estimates that 10,000 transplants were conducted by the Chinese government 
last year, out of nearly 1.5 million domestic requests for organs); China Bans Trade in Human Organs, 
CHINA DAILY, July 16, 2006, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-07/16/ 
content_641780.htm. 
30
  See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 10 (asserting that real documentation of China’s organ-
procurement practice is impossible due to the Chinese government’s tendency to conceal its execution 
practices and conduct criminal justice operations behind closed-doors). See also Mike Steketee, Diplomacy 
Transplant, THE AUSTL., July 29, 2006, at 20, available at 2006 WLNR 13054451 (contending that 
China’s lack of formal reporting must improve to end human rights abuses in organ-procurement); 
Bryskine, supra note 20 (discussing how the lack of transparency in China’s organ-procurement practice 
makes it difficult to document the practice). 
31
  See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 19 (reporting that China’s increasing medical sophistication 
contributes to its organ-procurement program); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2 (discussing 
how Chinese medical developments have facilitated organ procurement).   
32
  Calum MacLeod, China Makes Ultimate Punishment Mobile: Fatal Injections Administered from 
Vehicles, USA TODAY, June 15, 2006, at 8A, available at 2006 WLNR 10282717. See also Baard & 
Cooney, supra note 21; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2; Hearings, supra note 1, at 57; Peter 
Nestor, When the Price is Too High: Rethinking China’s Deterrence Strategy for Robbery, PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J., Date, p 454-55 (discussing “Strike-Hard” campaigns and the death penalty in China); Stephen 
Gregory, Harvesting Organs in China: the Preparation Sujiatun, EPOCH TIMES (P.R.C), 2005, 
http://en.epochtimes.com/news/6-3-30/39868.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (stating that seventy offenses 
are punishable by death in China). 
33
  HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2. 
34
  See Baard & Cooney, supra note 21; Lee, supra note 27; Dead Prisoners’ Organs for Sale, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 9, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WLNR 3476902. See also Nestor supra, note 
32, at 455 (citing Murray Scott Tanner, Campaign-Style Policing in China and Its Critics, in CRIME, 
PUNISHMENT AND POLICING IN CHINA, 179 (Borge Bakken ed., 2005) (discussing how most executions 
occur around Chinese holidays including New Year, Lunar New Year, May Day, Tiananmen Anniversary, 
and the October National Holiday). 
35
  See Gregory, supra note 32; Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of 
Executed Prisoners, supra note 24 (asserting that China’s supply of transplant organ is due to its prolific 
use of the death penalty). 
36
  See Organ Transplant Regulation Drafted, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Mar. 13, 2006, 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200603/13/eng20060313_250155.html (noting that the global shortage in 
human organs presents the Chinese government with a lucrative market for human organs); Jill 
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China’s large supply of prisoner cadavers, the Chinese government is ideally 
poised to make lucrative gains from the sale of prisoner organs on the 
international black market.37  Over the past ten years, China has become a 
popular destination for foreigners in search of transplant organs.38  Foreign 
patients pay as much as $200,000 for an organ transplant.39  International 
doctors have reported numerous cases in which patients have traveled to 
China to receive transplant organs from executed prisoners.40  Such reports 
surfaced in the United States in 2001 when New York-based surgeon, Dr. 
Thomas Diflo, consulted with several patients in need of post-operation care 
after purchasing prisoner organs from the Chinese government.41  In 2001, 
the Japanese Department of Health launched an investigation into the 
Chinese organ-procurement practice after a number of Japanese patients 
experienced life-threatening complications with kidney transplants obtained 
in China.42  Although the Chinese government recently enacted the 2006 
Provisions on the “Treatment of Cadavers” to prohibit the commercial use of 
                                                                                                                              
McGivering, ‘China Selling Prisoners’ Organs’, BBC NEWS, Apr. 19, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4921116.stm; Dead Prisoners’ Organs for Sale, supra 34; Erik Eckholm, Arrests 
Put Focus on Human Organs from China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, available at 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/china/index.html?offset=360. 
37
  See Christine Gorman et al., Body Parts for Sale, TIME MAGAZINE, Mar. 9, 1998, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,987948,00.html?promoid=googlep (reporting that the 
international demand for human organs provides the Chinese government with an economic incentive to 
sell prisoner organs); Gregory, supra note 32 (discussing the “big business” of organ transplantation in 
China); Ian Cobain and Adam Luck, The Beauty Products From the Skin of Executed Chinese Prisoners, 
THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 13, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/ 
0,7369,1568622,00.html (indicating that China earns revenues by channeling organs from executed 
prisoners into the cosmetic industry, which uses the skin from cadavers as an “aesthetic filler” in beauty 
products); Don MacKay, Prisoners Killed for Organs, THE MIRROR (Eng.), Apr. 20, 2006, at 15, available 
at 2006 WLNR 6594837 (calling China’s practice of selling prisoners’ organs “widespread and growing”). 
38
  See Erik Eckholm, supra 36 (reporting that patients from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore 
travel to China to obtain transplant organs for a premium price due to organ shortages in their home 
countries); Organ Trade Confirmed, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Sept. 29, 2006, at 33, available at 2006 
WLNR 16815206 (reporting that China’s booming organ trade is “targeted” at foreign patients); Oziewicz, 
supra note 19. See also Jo Revill, UK Kidney Patients Head for China, OBSERVER INT’L (Eng.), Dec. 11, 
2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,,1664750,00.html (reporting that British and 
Australian patients are enticed by the prospect of obtaining organ transplants in China). 
39
  See Siddle, supra note 26 (reporting that foreigners pay more than $100,000 for the cost of travel 
and obtaining an organ transplant in China); Mariana Wan & Simon Beck, Organs of Prisoners Used in 
Ops, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 25, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 2196543; Sally Guyoncourt, 
Death Row Transplant Scandal, DAILY EXPRESS (Eng.), Sept. 28, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 
16789146 (reporting that a top Chinese surgeon offered to sell a liver to an undercover journalist for 
£50,000); Rommelfanger, supra note 23; Shelton, supra note 26.  
40
  See Baard & Cooney, supra note 21. See also TAIPEI TIMES, China’s Death Penalty is Blamed for 
Organ Trade, Jan. 10, 2001, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/01/ 
10/18972 (Dr. Lo Chung-man, a Hong Kong transplant surgeon, said his team counsels patients against 
transplants in China because they come from executed prisoners). 
41
  Baard & Cooney, supra note 21.   
42
  McNeill & Coonan, supra note 17.   
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human organs, human rights analysts remain wary that China’s persistent 
profit motive to sell prisoner cadavers will trump the government’s 
adherence to its new ban.43 
B. Human Rights Groups Advocate for the Elimination of China’s 
Procurement of Prisoner Organs Because It Results in Abuse 
Human rights analysts express concern that China’s economic 
incentive to sell transplant organs poses a conflict of interest between the 
government’s profit motive and the treatment of prisoners.44   Transplant 
interests dictate the time and course of execution procedures, often resulting 
in the physical abuse of prisoners.45  Many Chinese doctors describe 
incidents in which executions are purposely mishandled and prisoners are 
kept alive during the organ-removal process to preserve the tissue for 
transplantation.46  Human rights organizations additionally report that 
executions are routinely tailored according to specific transplant needs.47  
For example, prisoners are shot in the head for kidney removal, and shot in 
                                           
43
  MacLeod, supra note 32. See Provisions on the Administration of Entry and Exit of Cadavers 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 3, 2006, effective Aug. 1, 2006) available 
at http://wwwhrw.org/reports/1994/china1/china_948.htm#N_100 [hereinafter 2006 Provisions]; Effort to 
Regulate Organ Trade May Not Be Enough, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 16, 2006, at 14, available at 
2006 WLNR 19850604 (asserting that China’s 2006 Provisions fail to address some of the biggest concerns 
involved in organ-procurement); Shelton, supra note 26 (reporting that human rights groups are concerned 
China’s 2006 regulation will not be fully applied due to government corruption and strong economic 
motivation to continue selling prisoner organs). 
44
  See, e.g., McGivering, supra note 36 (Professor Steven Wigmore, chair of the Ethics Committee at 
the British Transplantation Society, says its time for the medical profession to condemn China’s practice of 
procuring organs from executed prisoners due to mounting evidence that these organs are used for 
commercial purposes). See also Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of Executed 
Prisoners (human rights groups are worried that organs are obtained from Chinese prisoners without their 
consent); Group Urges China to Detail Transplants, supra 29 (Health Ministry Spokesman Mao Qun’an 
admitted that China’s use of prisoner organs for trade purposes lead to “improper” transplants); Magnier & 
Zarembo, supra note 21 (Chinese Attorney Zhu Gongwei contends that the absence of proper organ 
procurement regulation has led people to “cut corners for a quick profit”). 
45
  See Organs Are “Stolen” for Transplants, W. DAILY PRESS (Eng.), Apr. 20, 2006, at 10, available 
at 2006 WLNR 6659346; Robert MacPherson, Britons Warned Over China’s Harvested Transplants, 
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Apr. 19, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 191350; Crackdown on Tourist Trade in 
Body Parts, N. Z. HERALD, Nov. 18, 2006, at B11, available at 2006 WLNR 19968296 (alleging that 
Chinese prisoners are “executed to order,” and that prisoners’ blood samples are matched with transplant 
recipients prior to execution); Hearings, supra note 1, at 57-58 (describing how blood samples are taken 
from prisoners prior to execution).  
46
  See Baard & Cooney, supra note 21 (Wei Jingsheng, Chinese human rights activist and former 
political prisoner, testified that China’s organ-procurement procedures are routinely used as the  means of 
execution, asserting “no one cares if [the prisoners] are alive or dead”); Crothall, supra note 15; Smith, 
supra note 24. 
47
  See Hearings, supra note 1, at 57 (describing how the Chinese government prioritizes organ 
procurement over the human treatment of prisoners); Crothall, supra note 15 (detailing how transplant 
needs direct the course of China’s organ-procurement practice). 
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the chest for cornea operations.48  Prisoners are also given anti-coagulation 
shots prior to execution to ease the organ-procurement surgery, and the date 
and time of execution is scheduled based on the transplant recipient’s 
request.49 An Australian newspaper recently revealed that the Chinese 
government uses specially equipped “execution buses” to procure organs 
from death-row prisoners.50  For these reasons, human rights groups and 
medical organizations contend China’s zeal for utilizing prisoner organs for 
commercial purposes compromises the humane treatment of death-row 
prisoners.51  Due to the frequency of prisoner abuse, the Chinese 
government’s strong economic interest in prisoner organs, and the lack of 
transparency in Chinese execution procedures, human rights groups 
condemn the organ-procurement practice and press for its abolition.52 
III. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS’ CURRENT LOBBYING EFFORT IS INEFFECTIVE 
AT PERSUADING CHINA TO IMPLEMENT REFORMS 
Human rights groups’ present approach to promoting reforms in 
China’s organ-procurement practice is unnecessarily overbroad and 
misdirected at China’s adoption of international standards.53  Human rights 
                                           
48
  Baard & Cooney, supra note 21. 
49
  See, e.g., Id. (claiming that Chinese hospitals are tipped-off by judges as to when executions are 
scheduled to occur); Scheper-Hughes, supra note 23 (reporting that a wealthy Chinese man was able to 
quickly obtain a transplant organ from an executed prisoner); Hearings, supra note 1, at 57-58 (describing 
how blood samples are taken from prisoners prior to execution).    
50
  Kim MacDonald, China Death Buses Linked to Organ Transplant Trade, W. AUSTL., Oct. 6, 
2006, at 8, available at 2006 WLNR 17293057; MacLeod, supra note 32.   
51
  See Desperate Singaporeans Seek Kidney Transplant in China, supra note 21; Shelton, supra note 
26; Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of Executed Prisoners, supra note 24 
(discussing China’s “soaring business” in conducting organ transplant surgeries on foreign patients); USA 
TODAY, supra 29 (claiming China’s practice of removing prisoner organs is “profit-driven with little regard 
for medical ethics”); Organs of Executed up for Sale, DAILY EXPRESS (Eng.), Apr. 20, 2006, available at 
2006 WLNR 6598612. 
52
  See, e.g., China’s Regulation Banning Human Organ Trade Takes Effect, PEOPLE’S DAILY 
ONLINE, July 2, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200607/02/eng20060702 (reporting that China’s 
organ trade is severely criticized abroad); Rommelfanger, supra note 23 (discussing how international 
doctors think the sale of transplant organs is unethical); Wan & Beck, supra note 39 (reporting that Dr. 
Huang Chen-ya, a Chinese legislator, condemns China’s procurement of prisoner organs as a violation of 
human rights); see also Rothman et al., supra note 17 (asserting that international medical and human 
rights organizations oppose China’s sale of human organs); Crothall, supra note 15 (positing that the 
presence of doctors at execution sites is unethical); Gregory, supra note 32 (asserting that organ 
procurement is conducted in secrecy, and that the practice is unethical and inhumane). 
53
  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2 (criticizing multiple aspects of China’s organ-
procurement and death penalty systems, and endorsing international standards on human rights); Executed 
According to What Law? - the Death Penalty in China, AMNESTY INT’L, AI Index ASA 17/003/2004, Mar. 
22, 2004, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa170032004 (condemning China’s organ-procurement 
and death penalty practices, and recommending broad reforms in accordance with international human 
rights dictates); Scheper-Hughes, supra note 23 (reporting that the World Medical Association condemns 
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groups press China to eliminate organ procurement from prisoner cadavers, 
and to reform other aspects of the Chinese penal system that facilitate this 
practice.54  They also premise their reform efforts on China’s adoption of 
international instruments and ethical standards.55  Human rights advocates 
view these instruments as the gold-standard on humanitarian protection, but 
such devices are unlikely to change China’s stance on organ procurement 
because they lack legal resonance in the Chinese system.56  
A. International Standards Offer Weak Legal Support for Reform 
Arguments 
Human rights groups’ current effort to eliminate prisoner abuse in 
China’s organ-procurement practice is ineffective because it focuses on 
China’s adoption of international standards.  Human rights lobbyists 
advocate organ-procurement reforms by encouraging China to adopt the 
collective ethical position expressed in international standards and 
resolutions.57  These instruments provide an instructive framework for 
                                                                                                                              
China’s organ-procurement practice); Eckholm, supra note 36 (criticizing China’s financial incentive to 
sell prisoners’ organs). 
54
  See, e.g., Steketee, supra note 30 (asserting that China’s use of prisoner cadavers in organ 
procurement is an “abhorrent” violation of human rights, which continues in opposition to the international 
position on organ transplantation); Shar Adams, Australian Surgeons Condemn “Horrific” Organ Trade, 
EPOCH TIMES (P.R.C.), Apr. 30, 2006, http://en.epochtimes.com/news/6-4-30/41024.html (last visited Feb. 
7, 2007) (discussing Australian doctors’ condemnations of China’s sale of prisoner organs); HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2 (discussing how China’s organ procurement program contravenes 
international human rights principles); Olympics Countdown, supra note 14 (reporting that the death 
penalty contributes to the organ procurement program, and condemning both of these practices as a 
violation of human rights); Editorial, Harvest of Shame China Should Halt Sale of Organs from Executed 
Prisoners, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 27, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 20514461; Rothman et 
al., supra note 17 (calling on China to stop organ procurement  from executed prisoners); Eckholm, supra 
note 38 (asserting that there is a strong connection between China’s death penalty and organ-procurement 
programs). 
55
  See generally, Executed According to What Law? - the Death Penalty in China, supra note 53 
(criticizing China’s failure to curb its use of the death penalty, and including the Chinese constitution in its 
list of international instruments on human rights); Olympics Countdown, supra note 14 (asserting that 
China’s organ procurement program violates international ethical standards).  
56
  Human rights organizations generally fail to support organ-procurement reforms with Chinese 
law, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2; Rothman et al., supra note 17; Hearings, supra note 
1, at 9 (calling on China to end organ-procurement from prisoner cadavers because it violates international 
human rights law and medical ethical standards.); Debra J. Saunders, Editorial, Global Bazaar in Body 
Parts, S. F. CHRON., July 20, 2006, at B9, available at 2006 WLNR 12469628 (discussing Canadian human 
rights efforts to combat China’s use and sale of prisoner organs, and concluding that “Western 
democracies” must be pro-active in ending the practice).           
57
  Examples of international instruments currently endorsed by human rights groups include: 
Resolution on Physician’s Conduct Concerning Human Organ Transplantation, THE WORLD MEDICAL 
ASS’N, adopted by the Forty-Sixth World Medical Association’s General Assembly in Stockholm, Sweden, 
Sept. 1994, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/physicianconduct.html; WMA Resolution, 
supra note 14; The United Nations’ Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res. 45/111, ¶ 5, 
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human rights protections, but they have no basis in Chinese law or policy.58  
They fail to correspond to traditional Chinese viewpoints, and they risk 
being seen as an affront to China’s fervently defended views on national 
autonomy.59  Any benefit derived from the promotion of international 
standards is more than off-set by the potential for such efforts to appear 
culturally intrusive.60 
B. Promoting Broad Reforms Obscures the Fundamental Issue of Ending 
Prisoner Abuse 
Human rights groups’ present campaign to protect prisoners from 
abuse is unfeasible because it advocates for sweeping reforms in multiple 
areas of China’s criminal justice system. Some of the most vocal human 
rights organizations contend that China’s organ-procurement practice, and 
the death penalty scheme that fuels it, must be fully reformed in order to 
adequately protect prisoners from abuse.61  It may be desirable, from a 
human rights standpoint, to completely abolish both the death penalty and 
the organ-procurement practices in China,62 but such reforms are 
unrealistically overbroad, and ultimately unnecessary to end the procedural 
and physical abuses that result from procurement procedures.63  Moreover, 
framing organ-procurement abuses as resolvable only through the 
                                                                                                                              
U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/111 (Dec. 14, 1990), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/ 
a45r111.htm. See also Rothman et al., supra note 17; Olympics Countdown, supra note 14. 
58
  See Hearings, supra note 1, at 9-10 (asserting that China must conform to international human 
rights standards); WMA Resolution, supra note 14; Olympics Countdown, supra note 14 (stating that 
China’s organ-procurement practice violates international human rights standards, such as the charter for 
the Olympic Games, which provides for “the preservation of human dignity”); Fundamental Principles of 
Olympianism, The Olympic Charter, Sept. 1, 2004, at 9, available at http://www.olympic.org/uk/ 
organisation/missions/charter_uk.asp; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2 (directing 
recommendations at China’s medical community, Chinese doctors are called upon to comply with the 
U.N.’s “Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in 
the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
Treatment of Punishment”).  
59
  See Wu, supra note 20 (emphasizing China’s social and cultural acceptance of organ-procurement 
from prisoner cadavers, Professor Chen Zhonghua asks the international community to assess the situation 
from both perspectives, and to understand China’s social and ethical position). 
60
  See Hearings, supra note 1, at 9, 12 (testifying before the U.S. Congress, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State Michael Parmly calls on China to comply with international standards).  
61
  Id. at 1, 13-14.       
62
  See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2 (discussing the close connection between 
China’s organ-procurement program and China’s widespread use of the death penalty).    
63
  Id. See also Olympics Countdown, supra note 14; Cooney & Baard, supra note 21; Sherri 
Williams, China’s Prisoner Abuse Unjust, Protestors Say, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 26, 2006, at 06a, 
available at 2006 WLNR 17811697 (alleging that the Chinese government harvests organs from political 
prisoners who are still alive).   
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implementation of far-reaching reforms presents the Chinese government 
with a weaker case for ending prisoner abuse.64 
First, endorsing the complete cessation of China’s organ-procurement 
practice is not the only means by which to ensure that prisoners are protected 
from abuse.  Human rights groups contend China’s practice of procuring 
organs from executed prisoners must be eliminated because it constitutes an 
inherent breach of human rights.65  Prisoner abuse is attributable, however, 
to deficiencies in the text and application of China’s organ-procurement law, 
rather than to the existence of the practice itself.66  Prisoner abuse is 
eradicable through the enactment of tighter regulations and the inclusion of 
controlling human rights protections.67  It is unnecessary to press for the 
total abolition of organ procurement in prisons because modifying, rather 
than eliminating, the practice can curb prisoner abuse.68  It is also unrealistic 
to press for the total abolition of China’s organ-procurement practice 
because the Chinese government depends on prisoner organs for nearly all 
domestic transplant and research purposes.69  It is unreasonable to require 
China to fully discontinue organ procurement from prisoner cadavers when 
prisoner corpses would otherwise be cremated if not used for 
transplantation.70  
Second, as some analysts have stressed, pressing for the total abolition 
of organ procurement in prisons risks driving China’s current participation in 
the organ trade further underground.71  China has historically conducted 
organ sales on the black market to avoid international scrutiny, and to benefit 
from the absence of regulation.72  China’s long-held policy of maintaining 
                                           
64
  See Olympics Countdown, supra note 14 (asserting that China’s organ procurement program is an 
adverse effect of the country’s death penalty system, and promoting reforms in both of these practices); 
Stefania Bianchi, China: Prisoner Consent for Organ Harvest Flawed-Amnesty, INTER PRESS SERVICE 
(Eng.), May 11, 2006, available at http://www.westlaw.com (World News).     
65
  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2; Gregory supra note 32 (arguing that organ 
procurement denies prisoners the right to their own bodies).   
66
  See Vivian Wu, Transplant Guidelines Taking Shape: Document to Outline Ethical Principles for 
Procurement, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 24, 2006, at 9, available at 2006 WLNR 18395399; Gregory, 
supra note 32 (describing instances of prisoner abuse). 
67
  China’s existing organ-procurement regulations are habitually misapplied and ignore. See infra 
Part IV.A. 
68
  See Wu, supra note 20 (quoting Professor Chen, who suggests that China’s organ-procurement 
practice can be improved by strengthening regulations and enforcement measures).  
69
   Id. See also Shelton, supra note 26; Wu, supra note 66 (considering the high demand for 
transplant organs, Chinese officials say the new regulations will not eliminate the sale of prisoners’ organs). 
70
   See 1984 Order, supra note 2 § 5 (providing that prisoner corpses be cremated). 
71
   Hewitt, supra note 15 (reporting that legislation aimed at restricting China’s organ trade could 
lead to an increase in organ smuggling); Rothman et. al., supra note 17.  
72
   See John Augustyn, New Details of China’s Death Camp Emerge, EPOCH TIMES (P.R.C.), Mar. 
17, 2006, available at http://en.epochtimes.com/news/6-3-17/39420.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007); Baard 
& Cooney, supra note 21. 
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secrecy and using underground channels to profit from the sale of prisoner 
organs demonstrate its tendency to shield its involvement in controversial 
practices from international observation.73  Endorsing sweeping reforms is 
problematic because it threatens to prompt the Chinese government to 
further conceal its organ-procurement activities if such reforms are 
perceived as unfeasible or intimidating.  
Third, advocating for the elimination of the death penalty confuses the 
issue of ending prisoner abuse and broadens the scope of reform efforts. 
Human rights groups view prisoner abuse as a direct outgrowth of China’s 
death penalty system, which provides executed cadavers into Chinese 
transplant units.74  Although the death penalty enables the organ-
procurement practice by supplying corpses, it does not directly account for 
the prisoner abuse that occurs during organ-procurement procedures.75  
Instances of prisoner abuse, such as that witnessed by Dr. Guoqi, arise 
during the preoperation and execution processes.76  The death penalty has no 
bearing on how prisoners are treated during the course of organ-removal 
procedures, and it has no effect on the efficacy or application of Chinese 
organ-procurement law. 77 
Using the prisoner abuse issue as a segue into the death-penalty 
debate is also counterproductive to reform efforts because it has the 
unwanted effect of expanding the scope of the organ-procurement problem 
into more controversial areas of China’s penal system, and confusing the 
elimination of prisoner abuse with the elimination of capital punishment.  
Regardless of whether the Chinese government’s use of the death penalty 
increases or declines over time, improving the treatment of death-row 
prisoners can be accomplished without involving China’s death-penalty 
practice.78  Pressing for the abolition of the death penalty to cure deficiencies 
                                           
73
  See Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of Executed Prisoners, supra note 
24 (demonstrating China’s tendency to shield its criminal justice practices from international observation); 
Smith, supra note 27. 
74
  Hua, supra note 18; China’s Death Penalty is Blamed for Organ Trade, supra note 40 (posing as a 
relative of a transplant patient, a reporter visited China’s Sun Yat-sen University of Medical Sciences 
Hospital No.1 in Guangzhou. He was told that he could purchase a transplant organ, and that the best time 
to obtain it was during the Chinese Lunar New Year when the most executions are performed). See Lerat, 
supra note 16; Scheper-Hughes, supra note 23. 
75
  See Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of Executed Prisoners, supra note 
24.    
76
  See Part I (discussing Dr. Wang Guoqi’s testimony about instances in which prisoners were 
physically abused during the organ removal process); Organs Are ‘Stolen’ for Transplants, supra note 45.     
77
  Cf. Olympics Countdown, supra note 14; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2.  
78
   Id. 
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in China’s organ-procurement program is an ineffective strategy for 
reform.79 
IV. CHINA’S CURRENT ORGAN-PROCUREMENT LAW LACKS CLEAR 
PARAMETERS AND CONFLICTS WITH CHINESE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROSCRIPTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
China’s seminal 1984 Order on the “Utilization of Prisoner Cadavers” 
serves as the sole legal authority for organ procurement from executed 
prisoners.80  Although the 1984 Order establishes basic guidelines,81 human 
rights groups assert this law lacks the necessary regulations to safeguard 
prisoners from abuse.82  In response to these concerns, China recently 
enacted the 2006 Provisions on the “Entry and Exit of Cadavers,” which bar 
the commercial use of human organs.83  Critics assert this law is unlikely to 
curb China’s role in the organ trade because it gives the Chinese government 
ultimate discretion over whether to approve cadaver exports and does 
nothing to reduce China’s core economic interest in utilizing prisoner 
cadavers for commerce.84  The 2006 Provisions do not address the issue of 
organ procurement from prisoner cadavers.85  Consequently, the 1984 Order 
is still controlling over China’s organ-procurement practice, and its attendant 
faults remain unaltered.86  Viewed against the Chinese constitutional 
requirement to protect and preserve human rights, China’s current organ-
                                           
79
  See also Macartney, supra note 20 (estimating that China executes more people than the rest of the 
world combined).  
80
  1984 Order, supra note 2 (authorizing the use of prisoner cadavers for transplant purposes).  
81
   Id. § 3 (providing that prisoner corpses can be used for procurement purposes when: (1) a permit 
is issued to qualified doctors; (2) a city prefectorate arranges the utilization of corpses; and (3) an order is 
issued to the “utilizing unit” to notify doctors of the availability of an executed cadaver after consent is 
obtained; (4) an effort is made to keep organ-procurement secret; (5) a timely cremation occurs 
postprocurement; and, (6) an exemption is granted for national minorities, which, in principle, cannot be 
used for organ-procurement). See also Wu, supra note 20 (Chen Zhonghua, a Chinese professor, asserts 
China’s organ-procurement practice must be subject to tighter regulations in order to protect prisoners from 
abuse).     
82
  See Baard & Cooney, supra note 21 (condemning China’s organ-procurement practice as a “gross 
violation of human rights,” Dr. Diflo detailed his experience with American patients, who received 
transplant organs in China); Wan & Beck, supra note 39; McGivering, supra note 36; Organs Are ‘Stolen’ 
for Transplants, supra note 45. 
83
  2006 Provisions, supra note 43. 
84
   Id.  
85
   See infra Part IV.A. 
86
  China promulgated the 2006 Provisions to strengthen organ transplant requirements, but this law 
does not address the use of prisoners’ organs, nor establish rules for organ-removal procedures. See infra 
Part IV.B. See also China to Tighten Rules on Organ Transplants, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP., Nov. 28, 2006, 
available at 2006 WLNR 20564134 (reporting that China will tighten regulations on its organ-procurement 
practice).       
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procurement scheme is inconsistent.87  The Chinese government’s on-going 
failure to address the issue of prisoner abuse and reform its organ-
procurement practice constitutes a breach of Chinese constitutional law.88 
A. The 1984 Order Authorizes the Use of Prisoner Cadavers for Organ 
Procurement but Lacks the Necessary Regulation to Protect Prisoners 
from Abuse 
China’s 1984 Order was intended to introduce the practice of 
extracting organs from prisoner cadavers, and to establish basic parameters 
for organ procurement.89  It outlines requirements on prisoner consent and 
medical supervision, but it fails to include specific regulation on how far the 
organ-procurement practice can encroach upon China’s standard execution 
process.90  The 1984 Order also leaves much room for interpretation about 
how to apply its terms, and how to regulate the actual procurement 
procedure.91  Due to these key omissions, the 1984 Order opens the door to 
procedural and physical abuse, resulting in the improper treatment of 
prisoners.92 
The government issued the 1984 Order “to support the advancement 
of medical research and to help change social customs.”93  It was designed to 
provide “temporary rules” on organ procurement from executed prisoners, 
and to gauge political repercussions.94  China originally endeavored to keep 
the existence of the 1984 Order confidential to avoid international scrutiny.95  
Until recently, China categorically denied that it procured organs from 
prisoner cadavers.96  Chinese government spokespeople now admit that 
                                           
87
  XIAN FA art. 33, § 3 (1982) (P.R.C.) [Constitution] (full text is available online at the National 
People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/english/ 
constitution/constToDetail.jsp?id=full&pages=3#Chapter2. 
88
  See infra Part IV.C. 
89
   1984 Order, supra note 2. 
90
   Id. §§ 1, 3. 
91
   Wan & Beck, supra note 39.  
92
   See Hearings, supra note 1, at 57.  
93
   1984 Order, supra note 2.  
94
   Id.  
95
   Wan & Beck, supra note 39. 
96
   S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 29, 2001, at 9, available at 2001 WLNR 3730332 (reporting that 
Chinese government spokesman Zhang Qiyue refuted claims that China harvests organs from executed 
prisoners, denouncing the allegations as “vicious slander” and “sensational lies,” and maintaining that 
China’s primary source of organs is public donation). See also Beijing’s Empty Words-Chinese 
Government Responds to Accusations, LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUND., Oct. 16, 1998, http://www.laogai.org/ 
news/newsdetail.php?id=1988 (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (speaking on the condition of anonymity, a 
Chinese government official admitted that China uses prisoner organs, but only when consent is obtained); 
see Organ Trade Confirmed, supra note 38 (reporting that Chinese officials rebuke allegations of forcibly 
taking organs from executed prisoners).  
MARCH 2007 REFORMING CHINA’S ORGAN-PROCUREMENT PRACTICE 447 
 
 
organs are procured from prisoner cadavers, and sometimes sold to foreign 
buyers.97  Nonetheless, China insists such practices are used only “in a very 
few cases.”98  Although the 1984 Order was never officially passed through 
the National People’s Congress, nor given more than “temporary” legal 
status, China has neither replaced nor modified its general provisions.99  In 
the absence of subsequent legislation, the 1984 Order continues to function 
as the governing authority on China’s practice of procuring organs from 
executed prisoners.100  
The 1984 Order provides cursory guidelines on organ procurement, 
but fails to adequately clarify or restrict extraction procedures.  It authorizes 
organ procurement from prisoner cadavers, focusing on three main areas of 
regulation.101  First, the 1984 Order requires consent to be obtained from the 
prisoner or his family prior to execution.102  Second, the 1984 Order 
stipulates that organ procurement can only be performed after death is 
confirmed by a supervising official.103  Executions are required to conform 
to the relevant requirements in Chinese criminal law for “death to be carried-
out by means of shooting.”104  Finally, the 1984 Order mandates that 
prisoner organ procurement be kept strictly secret to avoid negative political 
consequences.105  Medical workers are forbidden from wearing hospital 
insignia or driving marked vehicles to or from execution sites.106  These 
provisions offer general parameters on organ removal, but lack specificity on 
how to conduct the procurement procedure in accordance with the standard 
execution protocol.107  
                                           
97
  Macartney, supra 20 (reporting that the Chinese government admits that organs from executed 
prisoners are sold to foreign buyers).  
98
   See McGivering, supra note 36.   
99
  2006 Provisions, supra note 43 (omitting provisions on organ-procurement and treatment of 
prisoners).  
100
  See Macartney, supra note 20. See also Wu, supra note 66 (reporting that the Chinese government 
is currently drafting the first ethical regulations for organ-procurement); Foreigners Seeking Transplants 
Come To China for Organs of Executed Prisoners, supra note 24 (reporting that “permanent” regulations 
for organ-procurement are currently underway). 
101
  Cf. 1984 Order, supra note 2, with Gregory, supra note 32 (stating that the 1984 Order is unethical 
because it “involves collusion between security agencies and medical officials”).   
102
  1984 Order, supra note 2, §§ 3, 4.  
103
  Id. § 1 (requiring death to be confirmed by a “supervising procuratorial official” at the execution 
site).  
104
  Id.   
105
  Id. § 4; see Wan & Beck, supra note 39. 
106
  1984 Order, supra note 2, § 4-4.  
107
  Id. § 4, 1-3 (focusing on the bureaucratic aspects of organ-procurement, detailing procedures for 
obtaining permits and authorization, but leaving blank the question of how to conduct actual organ-
procurement procedures and preoperation treatment of death-row prisoners). See also Wu, supra note 66 
(reporting that the 2006 Provisions fail to address key issues, including the source of organs, the 
administration of the procurement process, and the definition of death). 
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The absence of adequate regulation in China’s 1984 Order produces 
repeated instances of procedural and physical abuse.108  The extent of the 
1984 Order’s human rights protections is limited to requirements on prior 
consent and post-mortem extraction.109  It lacks rules on how to conduct the 
actual procurement process, thereby failing to protect prisoners from the 
physical and procedural abuse that occur during organ removal.110  It also 
fails to indicate how death is determined.111  Moreover, China’s 1984 Order 
provides no direction on how organ procurement should square with 
standard execution guidelines.112  
Due to the lack of straightforward regulations, the 1984 Order is also 
frequently misapplied.113  Reports from Chinese doctors demonstrate that 
some of the most extreme cases of prisoner abuse occur in violation of the 
1984 Order’s existing textual requirements.114  Instances in which organs are 
extracted from live prisoners and executions are intentionally botched 
clearly contravene the 1984 Order’s stipulation that organ removal begin 
only after death is declared and conducted.115  These cases of abuse speak to 
a problem of misapplication rather than textual deficiency, and they 
underscore how the lack of specific regulations on how to define and 
determine death opens the door to instances of live extraction.116    
                                           
108
  Johnson, supra note 19 (reporting that Chinese Foreign Ministry Official Liu Jianchao admits that 
a “legal vacuum” exists in China’s current organ-procurement regulations).  
109
  1984 Order, supra note 2, § § 1, 3.  
110
  1984 Order, supra note 2 (failing to include regulations on how to remove organs from prisoners’ 
bodies, and how to determine clinical death). See also Hearings, supra note 1, at 57-58 (providing 
examples of prisoner abuse that occur as a result of China’s current organ-procurement scheme); China’s 
Death Penalty is Blamed for Organ Trade, supra note 40 (stating that China has “no national law 
governing organ donation,” referring to the government’s lack of regulation on the organ-procurement 
practice). 
111
  1984 Order, supra note 2, § 1 (indicating that the meaning of “death” is subject only to 
confirmation by supervisory officials).  
112
  Id. (providing that prisoners sentenced to death are to be executed “in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Criminal Law: the [death penalty] is to be carried out be means of shooting.”  This is the 
only reference in the 1984 Order’s text that stipulates how organ-procurement is meant to accord with the 
standard execution process). See also Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of 
Executed Prisoners, supra note 24 (reporting that Foreign Ministry Official Liu Jianchao dismissed 
allegations of that organs were taken from executed prisoners at jail camps, but recognized China’s lack of 
strict organ-procurement regulation). 
113
  See also U.S. Patients Line Up for Inmates’ Organs, supra note 18; Gregory, supra note 32. 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2. 
114
  1984 Order, supra note 2. Smith, supra note 27. See also Scheper-Hughes, supra note 23 
(reporting instances in which organs are extracted from live, anaesthetized prisoners).  
115
  1984 Order, supra note 2; Hearings, supra note 1, at 57. See Crothall, supra note 15. 
116
  See Macartney, supra note 20 (reporting that Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Huang Jiefu said 
there is a need for tighter organ-procurement regulation in China); Smith, supra note 27; U.S. Patients Line 
Up for Inmates’ Organs, supra note 18.     
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B. The 2006 Provisions Ban the Commercial Use of Organs, but Fail to 
Modify China’s Current Organ-Procurement Scheme 
China enacted the 2006 “Provisions on the Entry and Exit of Cadavers 
and Treatment of Cadavers” to regulate the transport of human corpses.117  
Although the 2006 Provisions prohibit trading in human organs, this law 
does not address the operation of China’s organ-procurement practice.118  On 
its own terms, critics assert the 2006 Provisions are unlikely to end China’s 
participation in the organ trade because they leave the ultimate discretion on 
all export matters to the Chinese government.119  More importantly, 
compared to the 1984 Order, the 2006 Provisions make no significant 
modifications to China’s organ-procurement law, entirely omitting reference 
to the use of prisoner cadavers.120  The 2006 Provisions fail to effect formal 
organ-procurement reform, and they fail to alter the 1984 Order’s regulatory 
scheme.  
The 2006 Provisions were intended to assuage international fears 
about China’s role in the global organ trade.121  They were issued as a set of 
“strict rules” meant to quell “fierce overseas criticism” and for the purpose 
of “protecting public interests, maintaining public ethics, and preventing 
infectious diseases from spreading.”122  Although the Chinese government 
has characterized the 2006 Provisions as a reform measure, this law 
primarily functions as a customs regulation on the transport and quarantine 
of human cadavers.123  It was drafted to restrict the postprocurement 
transport of human organs and thus does not affect how organ-procurement 
procedures are regulated or conducted.124  
The 2006 Provisions’ most significant feature is a ban on trading in 
human organs.  Under Article 8, “It is strictly prohibited to trade in cadavers, 
and to make use of cadavers to engage in commercial activities.”125  The 
                                           
117
  2006 Provisions, supra note 43; see also China Bans Trade in Human Organs, supra note 29. 
118
  2006 Provisions, supra note 43, art. 8.    
119
  Beijing’s Empty Words-Chinese Government Responds to Accusations, supra note 96 (asserting 
that the 2006 Provisions will be ineffective at curbing China’s commercial use of organs because “the 
directive does not prohibit the government itself from engaging in the organ trade”).  
120
  Wu, supra note 66.    
121
  China’s Regulation Banning Human Organ Trade Takes Effect, supra note 52 (reporting that the 
2006 Provisions were enacted to quell international concerns about China’s participation in the global 
organ trade). 
122
  See Id; 2006 Provisions, supra note 43, art. 1.  
123
  See China Issues Human Organ Transplant Regulation, PEOPLE’S DAILY, Mar. 28, 2006, 
http://english.people.com.cn/200603/28/eng20060328_253961.html (reporting that the 2006 Provisions 
were intended to “guarantee medical safety and the health of patients”).     
124
  See Hua, supra note 18. 
125
  2006 Provisions, supra note 43, art. 8.  
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term “cadaver” is defined in Article 2 as “dead human bodies and the 
specimens thereof,” including human organs, bones, and tissue.126  Although 
Article 8 seemingly provides an absolute bar to China’s commercial use of 
human organs, human rights groups assert that the efficacy of this law is 
jeopardized by its certification process, which gives the Chinese government 
full discretion to approve the transport of corpses.127  Under Article 7, if 
customs officials are presented with a valid certificate, the cadaver is 
released.128  The 2006 Provisions give no indication, however, about what is 
involved in issuing a certificate, or what, if any, standards are applicable.129  
Although shipment certificates must be ratified by Chinese agencies, the 
2006 Provisions provide no criteria for granting certificates and require no 
documentation of the cadaver’s place of origin.130  This malleable 
certification system, combined with the Chinese government’s strong 
economic incentive to profit from the sale of human organs, indicates that 
the 2006 Provisions will not be effective at eliminating China’s use of 
human cadavers for commercial purposes.131 
Compared to the 1984 Order, the 2006 Provisions do not adequately 
modify China’s organ-procurement regulations. They fail to include 
restrictions on the use of prisoner cadavers, and they impose no 
requirements on the actual organ-procurement practice.132  The 2006 
Provisions ultimately provide no guidance on how to resolve the conflict 
between meeting transplant needs and providing for the humane treatment of 
prisoners.133  Whereas the 1984 Order regulates the preprocurement 
conditions, such as consent, authorization, and notification of execution, the 
2006 Provisions govern the postprocurement utilization of organs and 
                                           
126
  Id. art. 2. 
127
  Id. art. 8; see also China Issues Human Organ Transplant Regulation, supra note 123 (including 
statements from Chinese Ministry of Health spokesman Mao Qun’an, noting that the 2006 Provisions serve 
as a “temporary” law). 
128
  2006 Provisions, supra note 43, art. 7.   
129
  Id. (omitting provisions on how certificates are evaluated by the Chinese government).  
130
  Wu, supra note 66. 
131
  See Leu, supra note 15; cf. with Bianchi, supra note 64 (claiming China’s new regulations are 
unlikely to work as long as the death penalty remains in wide use); Jonathan Watts, Beijing Cracks Down 
on Organ Transplant Trade, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 29, 2006, at 12, available at 2006 WLNR 5210748 
(discussing human rights groups’ concern that Chinese hospitals will not adhere to the new regulations to 
avoid the loss of revenues); Crackdown on Tourist Trade in Body Parts, supra note 45 (describing China’s 
lucrative trade in human organs and its recent regulation to ban the sale of human organs).   
132
 See Organ Transplant Regulation Drafted, supra note 36 (National People’s Congress Deputy 
Chen Haixiao worries that China’s progress toward enacting needed human rights legislation in organ-
procurement is too slow). 
133
  See generally 2006 Provisions, supra note 43 (reporting that the Chinese government issued 
organ-transport requirements, which are limited to basic licensing guidelines). 
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cadavers.134  Neither of these regulations establishes guidelines on how 
actual procurement and preoperation treatment should be conducted.135  This 
void in legal depth and clarity has not only roused reproach from human 
rights groups, but has also prompted some Chinese legislators to voice 
concerns about the practice.136  
C. China’s Organ-Procurement Laws Conflict with Chinese 
Constitutional Requirements to Protect Human Rights 
China’s organ-procurement laws conflict with Chinese constitutional 
proscriptions on human rights because they allow for prisoner abuse.137  
Viewed against Article 33, Section 3, China’s current organ-procurement 
laws lack sufficient regulations to protect prisoners from abuse.138  The 1984 
Order establishes few limitations on how to conduct organ procurement, and 
it supplies no safeguards to ensure that prisoners are treated in accordance 
with the government’s obligation to protect and preserve human rights.139  
Article 33, Section 3, requires the state to procure organs in conformity with 
human rights requirements and to fully incorporate these rules in its organ-
procurement scheme.140  China’s organ-procurement practice violates these 
proscriptions by allowing for prisoner abuse, creating an enduring conflict 
between the Chinese constitution and organ procurement in China. 
D. China’s Organ-Procurement Laws Fail to Pass Muster Under the 
Chinese Constitution Because They Allow for Prisoner Abuse 
China’s twenty-year failure to reform organ-procurement rules and 
implement human rights standards represents an ongoing violation of 
Chinese constitutional requirements.141  The Chinese constitution was 
                                           
134
  1984 Order, supra note 2, Sections 2-4; China Issues Human Organ Transplant Regulation, supra 
note 123 (emphasizing how the 2006 Provisions are intended to impose restrictions on organ-procurement).   
135
  1984 Order, supra note 2; cf. with 2006 Provisions, supra note 43.  
136
  See Organ Transplant Regulation Drafted, supra note 36 (worrying that China’s progress toward 
enacting “needed human rights legislation” in organ-procurement is too slow, National People’s Congress 
Deputy Chen Haixiao discusses the medical and ethical issues involved); China Regulations: Organs from 
Executed Prisoners Declared Legal, EIU VIEWSWIRE CHINA, Oct. 9, 2006, at 1, available at 2006 WLNR 
18182244 (reporting that China publicly denies that prisoner organs are used for commercial needs). 
137
  1984 Order, supra note 2; 2006 Provisions, supra note 43 (giving the ultimate discretion on the 
transport of cadavers to Chinese government officials). 
138
  See supra Part IV, A, B.  
139
  1984 Order, supra note 2; 2006 Provisions, supra note 43; Constitution, supra note 87, art. 33,  
§ 3. 
140
  Constitution, supra note 87, art. 33, § 3.   
141
  See also Baard & Cooney, supra note 21 (human rights activists condemn the 1984 Order as a 
breach of human rights, contending that prisoner consent to organ-procurement is dubious at best, and that 
China has generally ignored consent requirements in order to meet transplant needs). 
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intended to establish uniform national standards and provide binding legal 
authority over all national laws.142  The constitution’s preamble explicitly 
requires its full implementation into Chinese law to “reunify” the 
motherland under socialist policy.143  China originally ratified its constitution 
on December 4, 1982, adding amendments in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004.144  
These amendments primarily impose economic restrictions, but the 2004 
regulation includes an important provision on the protection of human 
rights.145  China views its constitutional requirements as “entrenched,” 
serving as “the highest and fundamental law” of the land.146  Chinese 
governmental literature confirms that the constitution is binding on all 
domestic law and drafted to strike regulations that conflict with its 
requirements.147  Any legal provision that conflicts with the Chinese 
constitution is void.148  
V. THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES STRONG LEGAL AUTHORITY 
FOR PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS REFORMS  
The Chinese constitution is imbued with the requisite wording and 
legal authority to lend support to reforms in China’s organ-procurement 
practice.  It functions as the supreme law of the land and requires the 
implementation of its proscriptions in all areas of domestic law.149 In 
comparison to international standards, the Chinese constitution serves as an 
effective tool by which to end prisoner abuse because it provides the 
Chinese government with a domestic source of human rights standards.  Due 
to its familiarity in the Chinese system and its command over Chinese law, 
China’s constitution provides a sound legal basis and a strong source of 
support for efforts to eliminate prisoner abuse in organ procurement. 
A. China’s Constitution Is an Effective Legal Tool to End Prisoner Abuse 
in Organ Procurement 
As the supreme law of the land, the Chinese constitution provides 
strong legal support for reform arguments because it contains binding legal 
                                           
142
  Constitution, supra note 87, pmbl.   
143
  Id.  
144
  A. Tschentscher, International Constitutional Law Project, UNIVERSITÄT BERN, Mar. 16, 2004, 
available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/ch00000.html (editor’s note to the constitution).    
145
  Constitution, supra note 87. 
146
  China Law Reports: Criminal Law 1992-1994 xxi-xxiv (Priscilla Leung Mei-fun ed., China Law 
and Culture Publications Ltd., 2001) [hereinafter China Law Reports].  
147
  Id. at xxiv. 
148
  Id.  
149
  Id. 
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authority and the capacity to strike laws that conflict with its 
requirements.150  Nowhere in the Chinese constitution does it indicate that 
prisoners are exempt from human rights protections.151  Whereas Article 34 
expressly provides that electoral rights are available to all Chinese citizens, 
“except persons deprived of political rights according to law,” Article 33, 
Section 3, makes no such exception to its requirement that human rights be 
preserved.152  This section’s broad mandate on the protection of human 
rights is applicable to cure deficiencies in the 1984 Order by requiring China 
to bring existing organ-procurement regulations within the ambit of Chinese 
constitutional proscriptions.153  For the 1984 Order to pass constitutional 
muster, it must be enacted into formal law and modified from its present 
form to include comprehensive regulation of organ procurement.  It must 
explicitly prohibit live extractions and establish how organ procurement is 
meant to accord with execution procedures.  The Chinese constitution 
provides a viable basis for promoting reforms because it is binding authority 
over organ-procurement law and requires the Chinese government to adhere 
to its mandate on the protection of human rights.  
The Chinese constitution provides a stronger foundation for reform 
arguments than international instruments.  The Chinese constitution lends 
greater legal support to reform efforts because it is a product of domestic 
Chinese law and policy.154  Whereas international standards lack resonance 
in the Chinese system, the Chinese constitution has important value as a 
binding and accepted legal standard.155 The Chinese constitution is 
embedded in the Chinese legal system and is designed to be fully 
implemented in Chinese law.156  Though comprised of some international 
language and terminology, it possesses more legal authority and commands 
greater government adherence than international human rights instruments. 
Due to the China’s firm stance against the imposition of foreign values, 
reform arguments grounded in Chinese constitutional principles are more 
likely to draw support from the Chinese government.   
                                           
150
  Id. 
151
  Constitution, supra note 87.  
152
  Id. art. 33, § 3; art. 34.   
153
  Id. art. 33, § 3. 
154
  The preamble outlines China’s general policy considerations, emphasizing freedom from foreign 
interference and rebirth of nationalism, which indicates that the Chinese government is predisposed against 
international legal and political intrusions, see Constitution, supra note 87, pmbl.   
155
  See Id.; China Law Reports, supra note 146 (characterizing the constitution as “an entrenched 
piece of legislation”). 
156
  Constitution, supra note 87, pmbl. (providing that “[all people] . . . have the duty to uphold the 
dignity of the Constitution and ensure its implementation”). 
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B. Chinese Constitutional Human Rights Requirements Are Applicable to 
Cure Defects in China’s Organ-Procurement Law 
The Chinese constitution provides strong support for lobbying efforts 
because it broadly promotes the protection of human rights and requires that 
these guidelines be implemented in all areas of Chinese law.157  The 
implementation of Article 33, Section 3 is required by Chinese law and 
encouraged by the Chinese government’s current effort to square 
constitutional mandates with conflicting national regulations.158  Although 
China’s constitution does not function as a penal instrument and cannot be 
used to seek redress for grievances against the government, it is capable of 
directly striking regulations that conflict with its tenets.159   
 Chinese constitutional laws are designed to be fully implemented and 
enforced, and recent trends demonstrate China’s effort to incorporate these 
standards into its national legal scheme.160  In June 2001, the Chinese 
government appointed a standing committee to examine domestic laws 
contrary to Chinese constitutional requirements and weed out provisions of 
Chinese law that fail to accord with constitutional strictures.161  Additionally, 
China’s legal system is evolving, and the Chinese government seeks to 
improve and develop organ-procurement laws.162  The introduction of the 
Chinese constitution and the recent 2004 amendment on human rights 
demonstrate that China is willing to enact progressive legal reforms.163  
Using the Chinese constitution to support reform efforts is a persuasive 
lobbying tactic because it presents the Chinese government with compelling 
legal support for modifying organ-procurement law. 
                                           
157
  Id. See China Law Reports, supra note 146, at xxiv (discussing how most constitutional provisions 
are implemented into domestic Chinese law, but broad provisions require enforcement at lower levels). 
158
  Constitution, supra note 87; China Law Reports, supra note 146, at xxiv; New Agency Set Up to 
See to Constitution Application, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, June 21, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/ 
english/doc/2004-06/21/content_341048.htm [hereinafter New Agency]. 
159
  China Law Reports, supra note 146; see also Albert Y. Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System 
of the People’s Republic of China 45-47 (1992).  
160
  See China Law Reports, supra note 146, at xxiv; Constitution, supra note 87, pmbl. See also 
Chen, supra note 159.      
161
  New Agency, supra note 158 (reporting that in May 2004, China appointed a Standing Committee 
in the National People’s Congress to review whether national regulations conform to Chinese constitutional 
requirements. The purpose of the committee is to “safeguard legislative unity” and to ensure that all 
domestic legislation operates in accordance with Chinese constitutional principles).  
162
  See, e.g., Organ Transplant Regulation, supra note 136; Revill, supra note 38 (reporting that 
Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Huang Jiefu wants to tighten and standardize China’s organ-procurement 
practice). 
163
  Constitution, supra note 87; see also New Agency, supra note 161.  
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VI. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS MUST NARROW THE FOCUS OF REFORM 
EFFORTS AND ENDORSE THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION TO ELIMINATE 
PRISONER ABUSE  
Human rights groups must change their current strategy to accomplish 
reforms in China’s organ-procurement practice.  The Chinese constitution 
requires domestic laws to conform to its prescriptions, and the Chinese 
government must modify its existing body of organ-procurement laws in 
order to meet these requirements. Although it remains an uphill battle to 
convince the Chinese government to implement the necessary safeguards for 
death-row prisoners, the Chinese government is less likely to reject reform 
efforts that draw from Chinese constitutional law than from international 
ethical standards.  Human rights groups must narrow the focus of their 
criticisms and promote Chinese constitutional human rights protections to 
make a more compelling argument for reform. 
A. China’s Organ-Procurement Laws Must Be Modified to End Prisoner 
Abuse by Conforming to Chinese Constitutional Requirements 
China must enact new provisions that expressly forbid prisoner abuse 
by establishing clear parameters for organ removal.  These regulations 
should reiterate “after death’ requirements, specifically barring the use of 
live extractions under any circumstance.  New regulations also must specify 
how organ-procurement laws are meant to accord with execution procedure, 
mandating that organ-procurement surgeries follow the predetermined 
execution schedule rather than allowing schedules to be set in accordance 
with last-minute transplant needs.  Prisoners must be adequately notified of 
the date and time of execution, and executions must not be conducted prior 
to the original date.  Provisions also must stipulate that the prisoner is 
informed of the purpose of anticoagulation shots and other medical 
treatment performed to facilitate organ removal. 
B. Modification of China’s Organ-Procurement Laws Must  Include 
Enforcement Measures to Ensure the Efficacy of Legal Reforms 
Due to the significant gaps in human rights protections in the current 
procurement law and lack of permanence in the controlling 1984 Order, 
reforms are needed to provide more comprehensive regulation of organ 
procurement and to eliminate areas of abuse.  New regulation must include 
an oversight system and provide requirements on monitoring the 
procurement of prisoner organs.  Human rights groups have suggested that 
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China keep records of all transplant procedures, including the time and date 
of procurement, the type of organ procured, and the name of the prisoner 
involved.164  To add another layer of protection, new procurement rules must 
include penal measures for officials who fail to conduct procurement 
according to established law. 
C. Reform Efforts Must Focus on Eliminating the Most Serious Instances 
of Abuse Rather Than Promoting Broad-Based Reforms 
Human rights groups must prioritize the elimination of prisoner abuse 
itself, instead of calling for the widespread reform of the China’s criminal 
justice practices. It may be preferable to eliminate the organ-procurement 
and death-penalty practices as the means to achieve reforms, but these 
measures are an unnecessary and unrealistic way to end prisoner abuse.  
From a tactical standpoint, human rights groups must narrow the scope of 
their criticisms because the problem of prisoner abuse can be solved without 
questioning the legitimacy of the organ procurement and death penalty 
practices.  Additionally, eliminating the discussion of these practices enables 
the Chinese government to review the core problem of prisoner abuse 
without being encumbered by the controversial and confusing aspects of 
adjunct reform issues.  Tailoring the scope of reforms to the specific 
elimination of prisoner abuse avoids confusing the issue with other areas of 
Chinese criminal-justice operations, and is more likely to appeal to the 
Chinese government.  
D. Human Rights Groups Must Endorse the Chinese Constitution Rather 
Than International Instruments to Promote the End of Prisoner Abuse 
Human rights groups must promote China’s constitutional protections 
to strengthen the legal basis behind their reform efforts.  The Chinese 
constitution includes the requisite human rights language and principles to 
eradicate prisoner abuses in the organ-procurement practice.  As the supreme 
law of China, the constitution provides the legal authority necessary to 
support and promote reform efforts.  In comparison with international 
standards and instruments, Chinese constitutional requirements on human 
rights are already embedded in the country’s legal tradition and respected by 
the Chinese government.  It is unnecessary for human rights groups to 
promote reforms by endorsing international standards when the Chinese 
constitution already provides such a framework.  Chinese constitutional 
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  See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2.    
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principles on human rights provide the necessary text and wording to lend 
legal support to organ-procurement reforms.  Moreover, because the Chinese 
constitution is imbued with binding authority and integrally rooted in the 
Chinese legal system, it provides a compelling basis for advancing human 
rights reforms in the organ-procurement practice.  Instead of pressuring 
China to conform to international standards, human rights groups must 
endorse the implementation of Chinese constitutional requirements on 
human rights to make a more persuasive case for eliminating prisoner abuse.  
VII. CONCLUSION  
The Chinese constitution must be endorsed to lend legal support to 
reform efforts and to encourage the Chinese government to modify its organ-
procurement law in accordance with Chinese constitutional human rights 
standards.  Human rights groups must restructure reform arguments in such 
a way as to draw maximum support from the Chinese government, rather 
than press for grand-scale legal modifications that risk appearing culturally 
intrusive and substantively overbroad.  The Chinese constitution provides an 
effective means of eliminating prisoner abuse in organ procurement because 
its text can be directly applied to forbid the mistreatment of prisoners.  To 
make a stronger case for the elimination of prisoner abuse, human rights 
groups must narrow the focus of reform efforts and promote the application 
of Chinese constitutional protections to cure human rights deficiencies in 
China’s organ-procurement practice. 
